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AGRICULTURE SUBSIDIES AND THE FREE
TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS
Pablo A. Ormachea *
I. INTRODUCTIONT omany in the developing world, internal American, European,
and Japanese rules governing domestic agriculture serve only two
purposes: first, to heavily subsidize agricultural products and effec-
tively close developed countries' markets, and second, to lower agricul-
tural goods' export value by depressing global prices. The United States
has been pushing since the 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami for a
hemisphere-wide free trade zone and asking that developing countries in
Central and South America eliminate their own barriers, while being able
to maintain its own protectionist measures.' In essence, U.S. trade offi-
cials are demanding that Latin America open its door to increased com-
petition from American producers while keeping the American market
protected against agricultural competition.
The United States originally hoped to create that free trade zone with
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Those talks have stalled
for the last two years largely because of disputes over farm subsidies and
other policies that distort global prices.2 The U.S. drive for a hemisphere-
wide free trade zone has thus failed, ironically because of an unwilling-
ness to liberalize. The U.S. government must eliminate or reduce its non-
tariff barriers to trade, primarily the agricultural subsidies, before it can
convince the zone's detractors to sign onto the multi-lateral agreement.
The ongoing debate between the United States and Brazil highlights the
issue for three main reasons: Brazil has the largest Latin American econ-
*J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, Class of 2008; B.A. in Government and His-
tory with minors in Mathematics, Eastern European Studies, and Business, Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin, 2005. I would like to thank Professor Joanne Scott,
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1. Otro Round con Estados Unidos Por el ALCA, INSTITUTO BOLIVIANO DE COMER-
cio EXTERIOR (Nov. 12, 2003), http://www.ibce.org.bo/Documentos/round.htm
("El Gobierno de George Bush no acepta, eso estd claro, incluir los subsidios
agricolas en la negociaci6n sobre la Asociaci6n de Libre Comercio de Amdrica
(ALCA), ni siquiera admite que se sugiera esa posibilidad"). See also Carmen G.
Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Food
Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433, 438 (2002).
2. See Mary Milliken & Kevin Gray, Americas Leaders Fail to End Free-Trade Stale-
mate, REUTERS, Nov. 5, 2005.
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omy,3 serves as the United States' FTAA negotiating co-chair,4 and leads
the opposition as a major leader of MERCOSUR, a regional free trade
bloc for many South American nations.5
This Note evaluates agriculture's role in the negotiations, and it pro-
ceeds in four sections. The first section explains the background of
globalization in general and the FIAA in particular. The second section
examines agricultural subsidies and the impasse. The third section then
moves on to discuss Brazil's opposition and its strategies. Finally, the
fourth section evaluates America's present political strategy and ad-
vances an alternative proposal to overcome the Brazilian-led resistance.
II. BACKGROUND
The current tangled web of bilateral initiatives, regional agreements,
and global negotiations creates a unique problem for world trade negotia-
tors. Because the World Trade Organization (WTO), bilateral free trade
agreements, and the FTAA all negotiate essentially the same issues of
agriculture, services, investment, market access, intellectual property, and
dispute settlement, it is not clear under which context an issue should be
negotiated.6 Not surprisingly, the less a given nation wants to concede on
a topic, the more it advocates moving that topic to another forum. For
instance, the United States' unwillingness to negotiate agricultural subsi-
dies independently of Japan or the European Union led it to push moving
agriculture negotiations to the WTO.7
Some commentators fear that the reverse will happen, with regional
free trade agreements potentially undermining the negotiations for global
agreements by reducing a country's willingness to concede issues on the
global stage when they can settle for a more amenable, regional agree-
ment with their neighbors. 8 This is particularly the case when those
neighbors are generally already their largest trading partners.9 Evidence
suggests, however, that free trade agreements lead to a partial reduction
3. CIA World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geosfbr.html.
4. Antecedents of the FTAA Process: Structure and Organization of the FTAA Negoti-
ations, FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Viewe.
asp (last visited May 2, 2006).
5. Venezuela's Chavez has opposed the FTAA outright on an ideological basis, mak-
ing it completely unrealistic to assume the United States could overcome his resis-
tance. I instead have chosen to focus on the possible by advancing a proposal to
bring Brazil into the American camp. See Milliken & Gray, supra note 2 (for a
short discussion on Chavez's intractability).
6. Deborah James, Summary of the Proceedings of the FTAA Negotiating Committee,
GLOBAL EXCHANGE, Dec. 4, 2003, http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/ftaa/
1311.html (last visited May 2, 2006).
7. Id. See also Brink Lindsey, El Fiasco del ALCA: Un Cancun en Miniatura, CEN-
TRO DE ESTUDIOS DE POLfTICA COMERCIAL DEL CATO INSTITUTE, (Dec. 2, 2003),
http://www.elcato.org/publicaciones/articulos/art-2003-12-02.html (last visited May
3, 2006).
8. News Release, Institute for International Economics, Regional Blocs Support
Global Trade System (Oct. 16, 1997), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/
newsreleases/newsrelease.cfm?id=36 (last visited May 2, 2006).
9. Id.
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in barriers to outsiders in the course of lowering barriers among the free
trade agreement members.10
The Most Favored Nation provision, article XXIV(5)(a) of the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs of 1994 (GATT), attempts to address
these concerns by mandating that trade cannot be more restricted for na-
tions that were not parties to the creation or expansion of a customs
union than it was prior to the formation of that union.11 As interpreted
in the Turkey Textiles case, "[a] customs union should facilitate trade
within the customs union, but it should not do so in a way that raises
barriers to trade with third countries. ' 12 Therefore, all trade agreements
involving WTO members, bilateral or regional, cannot directly negatively
impact countries that are not parties to the agreements-this ensures that
the overall effect of any agreement is one of trade liberalization. 13
A. GLOBALIZATION
Studies have shown that globalization is a positive force leading to
"faster growth, higher living standar[d]s, [and] new opportunities.' 14
Empirical studies have demonstrated that there is a strong correlation
between a country's level of openness to international trade and its per
capita income.15 Opponents of globalization, however, argue that the
costs outweigh the benefits and have organized an anti-globalization pro-
test alongside every major international economic summit in the last ten
years. 16 There are two main opponents to globalization: first, those who
are essentially anti-capitalist and second, those who blame a variety of
today's social ills on the disparate and unequal distribution of globaliza-
tion's benefits.1 7 In Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, poverty rose from
41 percent in 1981 to 46 percent in 2001, and an additional 150 million
people were living in extreme poverty.18 For "many in the developing
world, globalization has not brought the promised economic benefits."1 9
10. Id.
11. See Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Cloth-
ing Products, 57, WT[DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Kofi A. Anan, U.N. Sec'y Gen., Message to the Baur International Model United
Nations (Apr. 6, 2001), available at http://www.carolbaur.edu.mx/bimun2003/ pres-
entation.htm (last visited May 2, 2006).
15. Jeffrey Frankel and David Romer estimated that increasing the ratio of trade to
GDP by 1 percentage point raises per capita income from 1/2 to 2 percent. See
Jeffrey A. Frankel & David Romer, Does Trade Cause Growth, 89 AM. ECON.
REV. 379, 379-99 (1999).
16. See JAODISH BHAOWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 3 (Oxford University
Press 2004).
17. Id.
18. Overview: Understanding Poverty, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/
poverty (follow "Poverty Analysis" hyperlink; then follow "Overview" hyperlink)
("for the purpose of global aggregation and comparison, the World Bank uses ref-
erence lines set at ... $1.08 and $2.15 in 1993 Purchasing Power Parity terms").
19. JOSEPH E. SIG-LITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 5 (2002).
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Others, including prominent Brazilian and Argentine leaders, argue in-
stead that even the most pro-globalization nations have failed to liber-
alize enough, particularly in agricultural policy.20 Nations, whether rich,
poor, urban, or rural, have vastly different internal subsidies and protec-
tions, and attempts to standardize this across borders has proven an in-
tractable issue, 21 complicating international trade talks for the last fifty
years. 22 According to one study, developed countries spend $300 billion
in direct and indirect agricultural subsidies, 23 while others put that figure
closer to $360 billion. 24 A World Bank report from 2003 suggests that
reducing those agricultural manufacturing tariffs and ending all agricul-
tural subsidies would cut the number of those in poverty by 8 percent by
2015.25
B. FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS
1. History of Negotiations
The FTAA began smoothly enough in the Miami 1994 Summit of the
Americas, which launched preliminary FTAA negotiations for an agree-
ment explicitly involving, among other issues, agricultural subsidies.2 6
With only Cuba not participating, the thirty-four members of the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS) 2 7 agreed to a specific plan of action
where the countries' ministers would take a series of concrete initial steps
20. Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 437 ("Nowhere is the tension between the critics and
the proponents of the existing multilateral trading system more evident than in
matters of agricultural policy"). See also Laura Carlsen, Area de Libre Comercio
de las Amiricas: Un Fallecimiento a Tiempo, PROGRAMA DE LAS AMP-RICAS DEL
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CENTER COMMENTARY, (Dec. 7, 2005), http://www.
ircamericas.org/ esp/2975.
21. Agriculture has been at the forefront of trade policy, particularly since the Fourth
Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar in November 2001. Description to Over-
view of the Current WTO Agricultural Negotiations (The World Bank B-Span
Video Sept. 16, 2003), available at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/bSPAN/
presentationView. aspEID=452&PID=862 (last visited May 2, 2006).
22. Carter Dougherty, World Trade Organization to Seek More Open Markets, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at C9.
23. The Challenge: Reducing Poverty, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/
progress/reducing-poverty.html (last visited May 2, 2006).
24. See James D. Wolfensohn, Pres., The World Bank, Remarks at the Conference on
Making Globalization Work for All (Feb. 16, 2004), available at http://web.
worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20169719menuPK:
34472pagePK:34370piPK:34424theSitePK:4607,00.html.
25. Global Economic Prospects 2004: Realizing the Development Promise of the Doha
Agenda, THE WORLD BANK xxix (2003), available at http://www.worldbank.org/
prospects/ gep2004/full.pdf.
26. First Summit of the Americas, Miami, Fla., Dec. 9-11, 2004, Summit of the Ameri-
cas Plan of Action, available at http://www.summit-americas.org/miamiplan.htm#9
(last visited May 2, 2006).
27. The thirty-four nations include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico,
Peru, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See Press Release, Office of the
United States Trade Representative, Zoellick to Lead U.S. Effort to Advance
FTAA in Key Miami Meeting (Nov. 14, 2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2003/November/Zoellick-toLead US Effort
_toAdvance_FTAA in KeyMiamiMeeting.html (last visited May 2, 2006).
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followed by a transparent negotiation process between the heads of states
and governments or their representatives. 2 8 They expected the Ministers'
preparatory work to culminate in a completed and ratified agreement by
2005.29 Negotiations were officially begun in 1998 at the Second Summit
of the Americas in Santiago, Chile.30 At the sixth ministerial meeting in
Buenos Aires in April 2001, the Ministers received the draft text of the
FTAA agreement, which was eventually made public in four different
languages. 31
All three draft texts32 focus on nine major areas of trade negotiations:
"market access; agriculture; services; investment; government procure-
ment; intellectual property; competition policy; subsidies, antidumping,
and countervailing duties; and dispute settlement. ' 33 The combined set
of negotiated issue areas was originally envisioned as an all-or-nothing
approach.34 Countries would either have to agree to the package as a
whole, or reject it on the same terms. Traditionally, this approach serves
as an important tool for negotiations, allowing for a trading of interests
and giving minority positions greater leverage.35 This gave developing
nations a greater incentive to band together against the United States and
to create pressure for a fair dialogue. 36
2. Negotiation Impasse
In spite of the promising beginning, progress in the FTAA negotiations
came to a grinding halt in 2003, 37 with Brazil and the United States at a
negotiating standstill. Essentially, "[w]ithout [U.S.] concessions, there
will not be an FTAA, '' 38 largely because of protections for American
farmers.3 9 Brazil successfully challenged one of those protections, the
$264 million the United States spent on cotton export subsidies in 2004, at
28. Antecedents of the FTAA Process: The Preparatory Process 1994-1998, FREE
TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/View-e.asp.
29. Third Summit of the Americas, Quebec City, Can., Apr. 20-22, 2001, Declaration
of Quebec City, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Summits/Quebec/declarae.
asp.
30. Sherry M. Stephenson, The Current State of the FTAA Negotiations at the Turn of
the Millennium, 6 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 317 (2000).
31. Free Trade Area of the Americas, Sixth Ministerial Meeting, Ministerial Declara-
tion of Buenos Aires, Argentina (Apr. 7, 2001), available at http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/Ministerials/BA/BA-e.asp (last visited May 2, 2006).
32. Draft FTAA Agreement, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ftaadrafts-e.asp.
33. Kristin Sampson, "FTAA Lite:" Victory for the People or More Bargaining Power
for Transnationals?, AMERICAS PROGRAM, INTER-HEMISPHERIC RESOURCE




37. Milliken & Gray, supra note 2.
38. Mariana Martinez, ALCA: Lucha de Gigantes, BBC MUNDO, Nov. 2, 2003, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/businessbarometroeconomico/newsid_3234000/32343
79.stm ("En suma, sin concesiones no hay ALCA").
39. Alan Clendenning, Brazil's Silva Says Free Trade Zone "Off the Agenda" for South
America's Largest Economy, GLOBAL EXCHANGE, Apr. 20, 2005, available at http:/
/www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/ftaa/3017.html.
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the WTO in 2005.40 The United States has made clear its belief that do-
mestic support reduction can only be achieved through the WTO, be-
cause the United States adamantly refuses to reduce its protectionist
programs without reaching an agreement involving Japan and the Euro-
pean Union.41
Understandably, the United States is hesitant to disadvantage its farm-
ers on the global market, as Japan and the European Union are two other
major global subsidizers. This very hesitance, however, then lends sup-
port for the argument that subsidies have a significant market-distorting
effect. And if the United States, with its modern agricultural system de-
signed in economies of scale, fears for its competitiveness on a global
market skewed by subsidization, imagine the difficulties for smaller farm-
ers in Brazil or Argentina.
In an effort to restart the talks without directly addressing agricultural
non-tariff barriers, U.S. representatives offered a proposal where the
United States would eliminate all import duties for most industrial and
agricultural goods as soon as an agreement entered went into effect.42
One of the most noteworthy components would have made all textile im-
ports from the region duty-free just five years after the FTAA took ef-
fect.43 About 65 percent of U.S. imports on industrial and consumer
goods would become immediately duty-free. 44 Even so, Brazil and other
countries dependent on agricultural exports failed to follow the U.S. pro-
posal, undoubtedly because it failed to address non-tariff barriers for ag-
ricultural products.
3. FTAA-Lite
In light of the inability of Brazilian and U.S. negotiators to reach a
compromise on agricultural subsidies, 45 and with American calls for mov-
40. Ken Cook & Chris Campbell, U.S. Taxpayers Spent $264 Million in 2004 on Cotton
Export Subsidies Ruled Illegal by WTO, ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP (June
9, 2005), http://www.ewg.org:16080/issues/agriculture/20050609/step2analysis.php.
41. FTAA Negotiating Group on Agriculture, Summary of the United States' Negotiat-
ing Positions in the FTAA, FOREIGN TRADE INFORMATION SYSTEM, available at
http://72.14.203.1 0 4 /search?q=cache:FaEZvldmGjUJ:www.sice.oas.org/geograph/
north/uspoag-e.asp+United+States+FFAA+agriculture&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&
cd=7&client=firefox-a. "In 2002, U.S. farm support was 17.6 percent of the total
value of agricultural production, compared with 36.5 percent in the European
Union, and 59 percent in Japan." Robert Looney, The Cancun Conundrum: What
Future for the World Trade Organization?, 2 STRATEGIC INSIGHTS 10 (Oct. 2003),
available at http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/oct03/trade.pdf.
42. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Advances





45. The United States refuses to discuss agricultural subsidies outside of the WTO.
See Las Negociaciones Estdn Complicadas, ALCA: EL DESMENTIDO DE LA
REALIDAD No. 3 (May-Aug. 2003), http://www.cubaminrex.cu/Enfoques/Bole-
tinALCA/BoletinALCANo3.asp (last visited May 3, 2006) ("Estados
Unidos. . . persiste en que el espacio hemisf6rico no es el conveniente para discutir
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ing agricultural negotiations to the ongoing Doha negotiations of the
WTO, the draft FTAA prepared in 2001 had to be significantly amended.
Although the new draft incorporated some political compromises, it did
so at the expense of consistency among all the nations.46 The resulting
document would create a vague two-tier F-IAA system, with flexibility
for countries to choose the level of commitments they will undertake
under the agreement. 47 This would allow some nations to only partially
commit to the FTAA, while leaving others free to pursue complete liber-
alization; this FTAA-lite is predictably vague on contentious issues. 48 Im-
portantly, even though the new FTAA-lite condemns domestic
agricultural support, the preliminary draft opts to take agricultural nego-
tiations completely off the table and only "work toward an agreement in
the WTO negotiations on agriculture. '49
4. Failure?
Ultimately, even this softer version could not generate a consensus; by
the end of the 2005 Argentine Summit of the Americas, Argentina, Bra-
zil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, which represent nearly 75 percent
of Latin America's GDP,50 were ready to suspend negotiations, believing
that the stalemate made a fair free trade agreement impossible.51 Be-
cause of this impasse, the United States has shifted much of its focus to-
wards bilateral agreements (as discussed in Part V(A)), however, those
bilateral initiatives have ignored these five countries and have only been
executed with the smaller Latin American nations.52 Because the agree-
ments are therefore more of a political victory than an economic one, in
ignoring nearly three-quarters of the Latin American economy, they can-
not serve as a substitute for the FTAA.
III. BRAZILIAN OPPOSITION
Thanks in large part to its well-developed agricultural, mining, manu-
facturing, and service sectors, Brazil is Latin America's leading economic
la reducci6n/eliminaci6n de los subsidios agrfcolas, lo que no es aceptable para
Brasil").
46. See Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, Eighth Ministerial Meeting, Ministe-
rial Declaration of Miami, USA (Nov. 20, 2003), available at http://www.ftaa-
acla.org/ministerials/miami/miami-e.asp (last visited May 2, 2006).
47. "[C]ountries may assume different levels of commitments... [with a] common...
set of rights and obligations applicable to all countries ... [and may also] choose,
within the FTAA, to agree to additional obligations and benefits." Id.
48. See Id.
49. Free Trade Area of the Americas, Second Draft Agreement, arts. 15.1, 15.2, & 15.3,
FIAA.TNC/w/133/Rev.2 (Nov. 1, 2002), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/
ftaadraft02/draft-e.asp (last visited May 2, 2006).
50. Diego Cevallos, Is an 'FTAA-Lite' a Real Possibility?, IPS (Nov. 9, 2005), available
at http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id-article=3085.
51. Fourth Summit of the Americas, Mar Del Plata, Arg., Nov. 5, 2005, Declaration of
Mar del Plata, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Summits-e.asp (follow "Decla-
ration of Mar del Plata" hyperlink) (last visited May 2, 2006).
52. Cevallos, supra note 50.
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power with a 2005 GDP of $1.568 trillion, accounting for 36 percent of
Latin America's combined GDP of $2.8 trillion. 53 In terms of economy,
population, and land size, Brazil constitutes almost 50 percent of South
America.5 4 This size has translated into a willingness to oppose the
United States on a variety of issues, ranging from requiring a $100 fee for
a visa "to U.S. citizens in reciprocity for the identical fee paid by Brazil-
ian citizens, '55 to creating a free trade region separate from the United
States in the form of MERCOSUR. 56
Continuing in that independent tradition, Brazil has publicly expressed
an unwillingness to acquiesce to American interests in the context of
FTAA negotiations. Brazilian and Argentinean leaders, while not ideo-
logically opposed to the FTAA, represent some of the world's largest ag-
ricultural economies and drafted their own clause at the Fourth Summit
of the Americas, held in 2005 at Mar del Plata, Argentina, stating "that
the necessary conditions are not yet in place for achieving a balanced and
equitable free trade agreement" and making an explicit reference to the
current practice of subsidies. 57 As Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula
da Silva said in April of 2005, "[f]or two years, FTAA has not been dis-
cussed in Brazil, because we took it off the agenda. ' 58 These statements
by the U.S.' co-chair for the negotiation process show how unlikely a
hemisphere-wide free trade zone has become.
A. MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE OPPOSITION
The opposition ultimately comes down to an American aversion to ne-
gotiate on agriculture outside the WTO. Many countries in the proposed
F[AA depend on that industry. In 2001, Brazil and Argentina had a
combined share of 50 percent of all soybean and product exports, almost
14 percent of corn exports, and 10 percent of all wheat exports. 59 In that
same year, Argentina was among the world's leading exporters of sor-
ghum, sunflower, and peanuts and Brazilian agriculture accounted for 14
percent of Brazil's GDP, 33.5 percent of the value of its exports, and em-
ploys one in three Brazilian workers. 6° These Latin American countries
hoped negotiations would improve market access for their most impor-
tant good: agricultural products. By stripping the agreement of any agri-
53. CIA World Factbook, supra note 3.
54. Ambassador Celso Lafer, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brazil at the Inter-American
Dialogue, Washington (Mar. 1, 2001), available at http://www.brasilemb.org/pro-
file brazil/brasil-ejournallafer.shtml (last visited May 2, 2006).
55. Tourist Visa Requirements, Brazilian Embassy in Washington, http://www.
brasilemb.org/consulado/consular visa-tourism.shtml (last visited May 2, 2006).
56. Clendenning, supra note 39.
57. Declaration of Mar del Plata, supra note 51, at I 19(B).
58. Clendenning, supra note 39.
59. RANDALL D. SCHNEPF ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE: ECONOMIC RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, TRADE REPORT No. (WRS013), AGRICULTURE IN BRAZIL AND
ARGENTINA: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS FOR MAJOR FIELD CROPS 1-2 (Dec.
2001).
60. 31 percent of the labor force. Id. at 4-5.
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cultural negotiation, the United States removed the main benefit these
countries sought from liberalized trade.
This means, then, that to Brazil, the necessary sacrifices simply are not
being shared. As Brazilian Ambassador Celso Lafer put it, were Brazil to
ratify the FTAA in its present state, it "would be expected to change
numerous laws as well as make several new commitments . . . , whereas
the US would not be willing to amend its laws regarding matters such as
antidumping or to reduce its current level of subsidies to agriculture. ' '61
So even though the United States promised to remove some trade barri-
ers in February of 2003 when it offered to eliminate import duties for
many industrial and agricultural products immediately upon entry into
force of the FTAA, 62 the United States failed to please Brazil and other
nations dependent on food exports. Nowhere in the accompanying press
release did the United States mention any of its non-tariff barriers, stay-
ing completely silent on internal agricultural subsidies.63
Right now, the United States has a massive and ever-increasing agricul-
tural subsidy program that gave out $22.5 billion in 1999.64 The 2002
Farm Bill is projected to distribute about $190 billion in 2012, and that
figure does not include other farm programs such as crop insurance, con-
servation measures, and ad hoc emergency support, placing the total sup-
port amount even higher.65
While the U.S. economy is generally one of the most open in the world,
with its average tariff rates below 5 percent, 130 U.S. tariffs go higher
than 35 percent. 66 Of those, 100 are in agribusiness and on many of Bra-
zil's most valuable exports, such as tobacco, dairy products, and orange
juice.67 It almost seems as if these tariffs and import quotas carefully
target Brazil. For example, it is the world's number one sugar exporter;
the United States spent $2 billion protecting that domestic industry
alone.68 Soybeans are Brazil's top export; the United States spent $3 bil-
lion to guarantee minimum prices for American producers. 69 These in-
ternal subsidies then lead to increased global production and therefore
lower average prices, directly impacting Brazilian business's bottom line.
61. Ambassador Celso Lafer, supra note 54.
62. Press Release, Zoellick to Lead U.S. Effort to Advance FTAA in Key Miami
Meeting, supra note 27.
63. Id.
64. CHRISTOPHER CONTE & ALBERT R. KARR, AN OUTLINE OF THE U.S. ECONOMY
ch. 8 (U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs
1991), available at http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/oecon/chap8.htm (last visited
May 2, 2006).
65. BARRY K. GOODWIN ET AL., LANDOWNER'S RICHES: THE DISTRIBUTION OF AGRI-
CULTURAL SUBSIDIES (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.bus.wisc.edu/ realestate/
pdf/04LandownersRiches.pdf (last visited May 2, 2006).
66. Marcos Jank, U.S. Agricultural Protectionism: FTAA Seed of Discord, FOREIGN
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Clearly, agriculture is central to Brazil's economy (in 2005, it exported
US$31,811,125,000 in agricultural products70 and has the largest commer-
cial cattle herd in the world).71 Brazil's main goal with the FTAA was to
secure a larger market for its own exports, one third of which are agricul-
tural products.72 Without a clause eliminating or diminishing those barri-
ers to agricultural imports for the United States, Brazil loses a key
incentive to ratify the agreement. While Brazil is still willing to continue
negotiations on the FTAA, it is reasonably concerned that U.S. subsidies
and tariffs heavily favor U.S. economic interests. 73
B. CURRENT POLITICAL STRATEGIES
1. MERCOSUR
Understandably reluctant to wait for the United States to liberalize its
internal subsidy system, Brazil pushed forward on a regional program of
free trade through the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), which
is the third largest trade bloc in the world, after the European Union and
NAFTA.74 That free trade region is made up of Argentina, Brazil, Para-
guay, and Uruguay (with Venezuela in the process of joining). 75 Through
MERCOSUR, Brazil has continued to liberalize its markets-the zone
was expanded by extending associate memberships to Bolivia, Chile, Co-
lombia, Ecuador, and Peru.76 This bloc has also been negotiating for the
liberalization of trade with the European Union.77
As a response to the United States' heavy-handed negotiations, Brazil
has also pushed the United States to pursue negotiations on a so-called
"four-plus-one" basis.78 Essentially, Brazil hopes that presenting one
front with its MERCOSUR partners of Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay,
and Venezuela in free trade talks will lead to a fairer agreement and mini-
mize any U.S. domination of the terms.79 Only by balancing out the
70. Ministdrio da Agricultura, Pecuiria e Abastecimento, Brasil: Agropecudria - ex-
portaC6es totais, available at http://www.agricultura.gov.br (click on "estatfsticas"
(top right), then "Agricultura Brasileira em Ntimeros - Anuirio 2005" (first item),
and then scroll down and click on "5.1.1. Exportaqoes brasileiras de produtos
agropdcuarios") (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
71. SCHNEPF, ET AL., supra note 59, at 6.
72. Id.
73. Brazil and U.S. to Restart FTAA Talks, UPI (Jan. 31, 2005), available at http://
www.polarisinstitute.org/polaris-project/public service/news/ftaa jan_31_05.html
74. Ambassador Celso Lafer, supra note 54.
75. SCHNEPF, ET AL., supra note 59, at 34.
76. Secretarfa del Mercosur, Preguntas Frecuentes, http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/
contenidos/es/preguntas.asp#2.
77. External Relations, The EU's Relations with MERCOSUR, EUROPEAN COMMIS-
SION, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/externalrelations/mercosur/intro/index.htm.
78. Allgeier Unsure of Potential Date for Concluding FTAA Negotiations, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Feb. 11, 2005, available at http://www.polarisinstitute.org/polaris-project/
publicservice/ news/ftaa feb11 05.html (last visited May 2, 2006).
79. Doreen Hemlock, FTAA: Brazil, Whose Clout Pales Against U.S. Might, Wants
Balance, SouTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 9, 2003.
AGRICULTURE SUBSIDIES
United States' size-based leverage 8° can Brazil create a more balanced
agreement that explicitly addresses agricultural trade.
2. Group of 21
Brazil has also been pursing a global strategy in case the United States
continues in its refusal to discuss agricultural subsidies outside of the
WTO. With the Group of 21 (G21), Brazil hopes to balance leverage at
the global negotiating table. These twenty-one nations, led by Brazil,
China, and India, formed a cohesive negotiating bloc of countries at the
2003 Cancun Ministerial Meeting.81 The G21 differed sharply with the
more developed countries and prevented those countries from command-
ing the proceedings on a variety of issues. This coalition was particularly
significant because it was the first time in over twenty years that develop-
ing countries united in a common bargaining position.82 And even if the
United States succeeds in splitting the G21 with aggressive bilateral bar-
gaining, Brazil gained both substantial negotiating clout as a major leader
and formed a strong set of alliances with India, China, and South Africa,
which, when combined with MERCOSUR, give Brazilian negotiators a
great deal of influence on the world stage.
IV. GOING FORWARD: AMERICAN STRATEGIES
In response to stiff resistance to the U.S. vision of liberalization, the
United States attempted to push through a two-tier approach to the
FTAA. Under this approach, all countries would agree to basic liberali-
zation, with nations free to pursue a fuller abolition of trade barriers. 83
But even this simpler, less progressive proposal, developed at the Miami
2003 Ministerial Round, failed to meet the January 2005 deadline. 84 The
United States must pursue a new strategy if it hopes to resurrect the
FTAA.
A. DIVIDE AND CONQUER
Shortly after the creation of FTAA-lite, and believing that the multi-
lateral aspect of the negotiations led to the standstill, the United States
began pursuing a "divide and conquer" strategy by forging separate free
trade accords with either individual nations or smaller regions. 85 The bi-
lateral negotiations have so far been with Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecua-
80. See id. ("'They're an elephant compared to us,' Parolin said of the U.S. economy,
10 times the size of Brazil's and with almost 20 times the trade").
81. Jane Bussey, Nations Dig in Their Heels at WTO Face-Off, MIAMI HERALD, Sept.
12, 2003, available at http://www.tradeobservatory.org/headlines.cfm?reflD=18611.
82. Looney, supra note 41.
83. Ministerial Declaration of Miami, supra note 46.
84. This proposal has also been called "FTAA-lite" by critics. See Clendenning, supra
note 39.
85. Hemlock, supra note 79.
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dor, Peru,86 and the major regional agreement with Central America.87
With these bilateral agreements, the United States has effectively isolated
each country from its hemispheric context and thereby reduced its negoti-
ating power.88
In 2002, America and Chile concluded negotiations on a free trade
agreement where both ministers explicitly anticipated that the agreement
would encourage the FTAA negotiation progress. 89 While that 2002
agreement gradually made about three-quarters of both United States
and Chilean farm goods tariff-free, it ignored the impact of non-tariff bar-
riers.90 Chile has different concerns than Brazil or Argentina because it
does not depend on agricultural exports to the same extent-the average
U.S. tariff on the vast majority of Chilean goods is less than 4 percent. 91
Importantly, signing a similar bilateral free trade agreement could have
Brazilian farmers competing with heavily subsidized U.S. farmers.
But even bilateral agreements run into problems with the United
States' unwillingness to budge on agriculture. Panama, whose govern-
ment presented the text to continue negotiating the FTAA in the 2005
Fourth Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata, Argentina, demands
protections against subsidized import surges in basic crops that could
drive its small farmers out of work.92 Additionally, concerns have been
raised about impoverished corn farmers in Mexico and rice farmers in
Honduras and Haiti being driven to other employment because of
America's subsidized products. 93 A study that examined NAFA's im-
pact on Mexico found that the value of subsidized imports from the
United States went from $1,830 million in 1980 to $4,655 million in
2001. 94 Logically, an increase in imports negatively impacts domestic
production. Although reducing or eliminating agriculture protections is
extremely important for rural Latin American countries, the United
States has shown little flexibility on the matter.
86. Sampson, supra note 33.
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B. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY: ELIMINATE THE SUBSIDIES
The United States stands to gain immensely from a multi-lateral agree-
ment and should redouble its efforts to push through the FTAA instead
of discarding it. This means the United States should cut its agricultural
subsidies or risk foregoing the substantial benefits of the FTAA to the
U.S. economy.
1. Importance of the FTAA
The geographic proximity of Latin America makes it an obvious trade
partner for the United States. But this market opportunity remains
largely untapped. In 2001, U.S. trade with Latin American countries (ex-
cluding Canada and Mexico) was only 8 percent of total U.S. trade.95
Eliminating Latin American tariffs, which average from 10 percent to 15
percent, 96 would open up these markets, increasing both the average U.S.
family's income, by $814 a year, and U.S. market share within this hemi-
sphere. 97 In addition to the general market expansion that would result
from increased U.S.-Latin American trade, the FTAA could uniquely
support some of the United States' most struggling industries. For exam-
ple, the U.S. auto industry could benefit enormously from an agreement.
Today, U.S. auto-makers must pay a 35 percent tariff on all exports to
MERCOSUR nations,98 and ratifying an FTAA could add as many as 2.5
million units to the annual sales of new cars and light trucks throughout
the entire Western Hemisphere.9 9
The FTAA would also provide stability to U.S. trade interests during
times of economic distress by ensuring that Latin American markets re-
main open to U.S. exports during times of crisis. During its currency cri-
sis of the 1980s, Mexico raised its tariffs and shut out U.S. exports. When
another currency crisis happened ten years later, the newly enacted
NAFTA kept the Mexican market open to U.S. goods.10 0 Because U.S.
goods accounted for 79 percent of all Mexican imports, 10 1 closing that
market would have significantly impacted U.S. business' bottom-line. By
making sure those markets stay open, the FTAA would also help Ameri-
can businesses weather any economic downturns.
95. Jenny Bates, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Why the United States Must
Take the Lead, BLUEPRINT MAGAZINE, Feb. 7, 2001, at 11, available at http://
www.ppionline.org/ppi-ci.cfm?knlgArealD=108&subseclD=206&contentlD=2974
96. Id.
97. TEHSIN FARUK ET AL., FTAA-WHY IT'S BENEFICIAL (2003), available at http://
www.umassd.edu/iba/reports/ftaa-tehshin.pdf.
98. Bates, supra note 95.
99. John S. McClenahen, Rougher Ride After NAFTA?, INDUSTRY WEEK (Feb. 2004),
available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-hb3044/is_200402/ai_n1303
5069 (last visited May 2, 2006).
100. Bates, supra note 95.
101. Market Report t- Nov '99 - Mexico Focus: The Doubtful Future of the FTAA, INFO
AMERICAS (Nov. 1999), available at http://tendencias.infoamericas.com/mar-
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Finally, having a uniform trade agreement would be far more economi-
cally efficient simply by eliminating regulatory variations. A company al-
ready sending widgets to Argentina cannot increase production and send
them to Chile without pouring over a new set of trade documents.
Streamlining today's patchwork of regional and bilateral agreements
would allow American businesses to respond far more quickly to any new
opportunity.
2. Proposed Solution
Even though Japan and Europe so far refuse to reduce their subsidies,
the United States should therefore eliminate or substantially reduce its
protectionist agricultural programs. Only then will Brazil and
MERCOSUR actively support the FIFAA. Opening up agricultural trade
within the Western Hemisphere could push Japan and the European
Union towards liberalization, out of fear of being left behind. The U.S.
Trade Representative has openly criticized Japan's and the European
Union's opposition to cutting agricultural barriers to trade, 10 2 and by tak-
ing the bold first step, the United States could lead the way while becom-
ing more economically efficient.
This effect has already been seen in U.S. confectionary production,
where exports to Mexico and Canada increased 22 percent by 2003
thanks to the implementation of NAFA.10 3 Such an expansion for U.S.
market share would often come at the expense of less efficient industries
within Europe and Japan, which would, logically, give greater weight to
advocates of liberalization within those economies.
More importantly, those subsidies, far from protecting the small
farmer, benefit the 17 percent largest producers that represent about 80
percent of all U.S. agricultural output. 10 4 Since the subsidy system covers
the difference between the selling price and the cost of production, com-
panies have an incentive to produce as much as possible. This action then
increases supply, leading to lower prices and a greater subsidy. It has
reached the point where more than 92 percent of all farmers rely heavily
on off-farm income. 10 5 Eliminating the subsidy system would push prices
to accurately reflect the cost of production and remove a deadweight on
the U.S. economy (both in terms of shifting manpower away from a
highly inefficient industry and in terms of federal tax money). Essen-
102. USTR's Zoellick Criticizes Japan on WTO Ag Negotiations, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE (Feb. 16, 2003), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2003/Dec/31-
190215.html.
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tiations in the Free Trade of the Americas, FTAA.soc/civ/96 (May 1, 2003), available
at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/spcomm/SOC/Contributions/Miami/cscv96_e.asp (last
visited Aug. 24, 2006).
104. Jank, supra note 66.
105. Prairie Writers Circle, Restructuring Farm Subsidies, WORKING FOR CHANGE
(Apr. 24, 2006), http://www.workingforchange.com/article.cfm?ltemlD=20689 (last
visited May 2, 2006).
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tially, if Brazil can produce soybeans cheaper than the United States,
then it makes sense for the United States to dedicate more resources,
public and private, towards competitive industries.
Subsidization can also cripple internal development of new industries.
U.S. sugar has been driven to prohibitively expensive levels for biodiesel
and ethanol manufacturers, forcing them to use corn. 0 6 Using Brazilian
sugarcane would save enough in costs of production to allow for commer-
cial viability at $40 per barrel instead of the $60 required by corn-based
ethanol. 10 7 This has undoubtedly contributed to Brazil's much higher
penetration rate of more environmentally-friendly fuels.' 0 8 By eliminat-
ing those subsidies and the current restrictions on sugarcane imports, the
United States could follow Brazil's lead and become far less dependent
on foreign fuel. Such a move would be of great interest to Europe, par-
ticularly since Russia has already used its energy supplies as a political
weapon against ex-Soviet states. 109
By eliminating those subsidies and benefiting the Brazilian farmer, the
United States benefits itself in another, less obvious way. Subsidizing ag-
ricultural prices within the United States lowers prices worldwide. This is
not only because a major global market is effectively closed, but also be-
cause the United States is a major exporter in all sorts of protected agri-
cultural goods. That means lower incomes for soybean or sugar farmers
in Brazil (or any other Latin American country) and in turn less money
for schools. When foreign farmers' incomes drop too far, they search for
a job that pays a living wage, often migrating into the United States.
As this Note mentioned earlier, Brazil has already successfully chal-
lenged the $264 million the United States spent protecting its cotton in-
dustry at the WTO in 2005.110 If WTO jurisprudence continues to fall
against agricultural subsidies, the United States might find that much of
its leverage for future WTO negotiations could become illegal. Alterna-
tively, these developments could spill over into the FTAA negotiations
and bring the parties together by doing away with agriculture as a major
point of contention.
V. CONCLUSION
With the FTAA, the United States expected to not only open up Latin
America to U.S. goods and services, but also to benefit the entire hemi-
sphere by increasing U.S.-Latin American trade, increasing trade within
106. Ethanol, THE ECONOMIST, July 15, 2006, at 93, available at www.economist.com/
markets/indicators/displaystory.cfm?story-id=7167086.
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dex.html.
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Latin America, and encouraging more foreign direct investment.'11 The
United States has already demonstrated a willingness to agree to rela-
tively lighter intellectual property protections, 12 leaving agricultural sub-
sidies as the last major stumbling block. Since a failure to reach a
consensus with Brazil and its bargaining partners could shut the United
States out of an enormous and growing market, America must reduce or
eliminate its agricultural tariffs.
Even though Article XXIV of the GATT of 1994 does not allow trade
agreements to raise barriers to trade for nations that were not a party to
that agreement, the European Union has been actively negotiating with
MERCOSUR and a United States failure to act could push the
MERCOSUR nations towards imports from the European Union at the
expense of the United States. Locking in economic reforms across bor-
ders would reduce risk for U.S. investors, promote development, and
boost foreign investment. The benefits of more prosperous, stable, and
democratic neighbors far outweighs the hit to U.S. agribusiness' pocket-
book, particularly since increasing economic cooperation increases politi-
cal cooperation on issues of common concern, such as illegal drug
trafficking. The United States must take the first step and offer reduced
or eliminated agricultural subsidies or it risks losing all momentum in its
push for the FTAA.
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